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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Watt appeals from the district court's appellate decision affirming the 
magistrate's order denying Watt's motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Watt was issued a citation for possession of marijuana and possession of 
paraphernalia. (R., p.5.) Watt filed a motion to suppress, contending "the officer 
unreasonably extended the detention ... after the purpose of the stop had been 
abandoned." (R., p.17.) At the suppression hearing, Watt clarified that "it was 
the conversion of the consensual encounter into an unreasonable detention that 
was the subject of' his request for suppression. (R., p.37 n.3.) The magistrate 
denied the motion, Watt entered a conditional guilty plea to both possession 
charges, reserving the right to appeal the suppression issue, and the district 
court affirmed the denial on intermediate appeal. (R., pp.36-40, 43, 82-93, 45-
46.) Watt timely appealed from the district court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order. (R., pp.95-97.) 
1 
ISSUE 
Watt states the issue on appeal as: 
I. Did the trial court err when it failed to grant the defendant's 
Motion to Suppress based on the lack of reasonable articulable 
suspicion to prolong the detention in violation of Mr. Watt's 4th, 5th, 
and 6th Amendment Rights of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 13 and 17 of the Idaho Constitution?[1] 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Watt failed to show error in the district court's intermediate appellate 
decision affirming the magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress? 
1 Although Watt cites multiple constitutional amendments in his statement of the 
issue, he only argues a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Because Watt has failed to 
present any argument in support of any other basis for finding a constitutional 
violation (see generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11), any such claim is waived. 
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996) (noting an issue will not 
be considered if "either authority or argument is lacking" and declining to 
consider appellant's claim because he failed to "provide[] a single authority or 
legal proposition to support his argument"). 
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ARGUMENT 
Watt Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Watt challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, contending as he did 
below that law enforcement unlawfully prolonged his detention to facilitate a drug 
dog sniff of his car. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) Watt's argument fails. A review 
of the applicable law, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and the 
magistrate court's factual findings and conclusions of law supports the district 
court's determination that the magistrate did not err in denying Watt's motion to 
suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kl 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kl (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
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"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any 
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
C. Watt Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Intermediate 
Appellate Decision Affirming The Magistrate's Denial Of Watt's 
Suppression Motion 
Following the suppression hearing, the magistrate filed a written decision 
that includes the following factual findings: 
On February 12, 2013, at approximately 10:15 p.m., Ada 
County Sheriff's Deputy Barry Clark was on routine patrol in Eagle, 
Idaho near the intersection of Eagle Rd[.] and Easy Jet. Deputy 
Clark pulled into the parking lot of a closed business at that location 
in order to complete some paperwork. Upon proceeding into the 
back parking lot of the business, the Deputy noted a silver Buick 
passenger car near the business' dumpster. Deputy Clark 
observed that the business was closed and that there were no 
other cars in the lot. Because the Deputy rarely saw anyone at the 
business after 8:00 p.m., he proceeded to approach the dumpster 
where he saw a male on the side of the dumpster's fence-like 
enclosure, who then walked into the dumpster enclosure and then 
exited the enclosure walking towards the silver Buick. Deputy Clark 
parked his vehicle and approached the male and asked him what 
he was doing there. The male, later identified as Jaryn Watt, 
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responded that he was headed to a friend's house and had stopped 
there to throw away some trash. Immediately upon contact, Deputy 
Clark noted that Watt's eyes did not react to the light of his 
flashlight and that they appeared bloodshot and watery, although 
Watt did not smell of an alcoholic beverage. Deputy Clark inquired 
of Watt whether he was taking prescription medication to which 
Watt replied he was not. Deputy Clark then went to his patrol 
vehicle with Watt's Idaho Driver's License to check wants and 
warrants and to determine if a narcotics detention canine unit was 
in the area. Pending the canine unit's arrival, Deputy Clark 
proceeded to conduct Field Sobriety Tests which revealed Watt's 
inability to estimate passage of time, eyelid tremors, and elevated 
pulse; all indicative of intoxicant use. Deputy Tena and his canine 
unit arrived just prior to Deputy Clark's completion of field sobriety 
tests with Watt. Watt then admitted to possession of a small 
amount of marijuana along with a pipe in a bag in the front of his 
car. 
(R., pp.36-37 (footnotes omitted).) 
The magistrate also found that "Deputy Clark did not deploy his overhead 
lights or effect a traffic stop, rather his intent was a consensual contact with" Watt 
(R., p.36 n.1 ), and that "it took approximately seven minutes from Deputy Clark's 
first contact with [Watt] for Deputy Tena and his canine unit to arrive at the 
contact location" (R., p.37 n.2). 
Watt does not dispute any of the magistrate's factual findings. (See 
generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) And, the district court found the findings are 
"supported by the record." (R., pp.87-88.) Watt instead argues "[t]here was 
nothing to suggest to the officer that criminal activity was afoot and instead of 
concluding the encounter, the officer had [Watt] wait an additional five minutes 
for the drug detection dog and then asked questions with respect to illegal 
drugs." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Watt further argues his "detention was 
unreasonably lengthened when Officer Clark began testing [him] with regards to 
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a potential DUI investigation," claiming It "is specifically telling" that Officer Clark 
"performed in his own tests in an apparent stall and delay tactic to ensure the 
arrival of the K9" rather than performing "standard field sobriety testing" such as 
the "horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn, [and] one leg stand." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.11.) Watts' argument is unsupported by the facts and the law. 
"The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and 
seizures applies to the seizures of persons through arrests or detentions falling 
short of arrest." State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct. 
App. 2002) (citations omitted). "Under Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)], an 
investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts 
which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). "The justification for an investigate detention is 
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances then known to the officer." kl 
(citations omitted). "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Roe, 140 
Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926,931 (Ct. App. 2004). "There is no rigid time-limit for 
determining when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court 
must consider the scope of the detention and the law enforcement purposes to 
be served, as well as the duration of the stop." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 
490,496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 675, 685-86 (1985)). 
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Watt does not dispute that his initial contact with Officer Clark was a 
consensual encounter. (See Supp. Tr., p.46, L.24 - p.47, L.1; Appellant's Brief, 
p.10 ("Officer Clark immediately directed his efforts toward a drug/DUI 
investigation completely unrelated to the initial consensual encounter.").) Thus, 
the only questions are whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion to 
detain Watt after the initial consensual contact and whether the length of that 
detention was reasonable. The answer to both questions is yes. 
Once Deputy Clark made contact with Watt, he quickly had reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Watt was under the influence of drugs and had, by his 
own admission, driven to the parking lot in which Deputy Clark first made contact 
with him and stated he intended to continue driving to his "friend's house." 
(Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.16-22.) Deputy Clark's reasonable articulable suspicion was 
based on his observations, which he made "right away," that Watt's "pupils didn't 
react much to light" and Watt's "eyes were bloodshot and watery." (Supp. Tr., 
p.8, Ls.16-19.) Because Deputy Clark did not smell alcohol and Watt denied 
taking prescription medications, Deputy Clark suspected Watt may be under the 
influence of a controlled substance. (Supp. Tr., p.8, L.20 - p.9, L.4.) After noting 
Watt's appearance, Deputy Clark returned to his patrol car to check Watt's 
license status and to see if he had any "wants and warrants." (Supp. Tr., p.9, 
Ls.11-14.) At the same time, Deputy Clark "typed Deputy Juan Tenna to see if 
he was close by" because Deputy Tenna is a "narcotics K9 handler." (Supp. Tr., 
p.9, Ls.14-15, p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.5.) Because Deputy Tenna was close by, 
Deputy Clark asked him to "respond to [his] location." (Supp. Tr., p.11, Ls.5-8.) 
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While waiting for Deputy Tenna, Deputy Clark checked Watt's eyes 
"to see how dilated they were" and noted they "were dilated to eight millimeters," 
with the "normal range" being "from three to 6 millimeters." (Supp. Tr., p.11, 
Ls.16-19.) Deputy Clark then "perform[ed] what's called the 'Romberg stand 
test," the purpose of which tests "someone's internal body clock"; if an individual 
is under the influence of a stimulant, his "clock is usually fast," and if under the 
influence of a depressant, his clock is "usually slow." (Supp. Tr., p.12, L.15 -
p.13, L.4.) With a "drug like marijuana," it can be "distorted" so an examiner will 
"also look for eye lid [sic] tremors," "body sway," "twitching of the fingers," or 
"grinding ... teeth." (Supp. Tr., p.13, Ls.5-9.) On the Romberg stand test, Watt 
"estimated 30 seconds in 20 seconds" and "had pretty distinct eyelid tremors." 
(Supp. Tr., p.13, Ls.10-13.) Deputy Clark also took Watt's pulse, which was "100 
beats per minute." (Supp. Tr., p.13, Ls.16-24.) Deputy Tenna arrived before 
Deputy Clark was finished with his tests and just seven minutes after Deputy 
Clark first made consensual contact with Watt. (Supp. Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, 
L.10) Watt admitted there was marijuana in his car after the deputies explained 
that Deputy Tenna "would be running his dog on the exterior of [the] car." (Supp. 
Tr., p.14, L.25- p.15, L.13.) 
Deputy Clark legally detained Watt for a reasonable period of time to 
confirm or dispel his suspicion that Watt was under the influence of drugs. 
Deputy Clark did not "prolong" Watt's detention by seeking the assistance of a 
drug detection dog; the drug detection dog was requested as part of Deputy 
Clark's investigatory detention and Deputy Clark diligently pursued his 
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investigation without delay. Moreover, Watt's belief that Deputy Clark should 
have performed different tests generally related to driving under the influence of 
alcohol instead of the specific tests chosen by Deputy Clark given his belief that 
Watt was under the influence of something other than alcohol, falls far short of 
showing an improper "stall and delay tactic" much less a constitutional violation. 
The district court and magistrate both correctly concluded the investigatory 
detention of Watt was constitutionally reasonable. Compare State v. Brumfield, 
136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001) (detention that began as 
traffic stop properly evolved into drug investigation based on information 
available to officer and it was not unreasonable to detain the vehicle's occupants 
for 49 minutes to await arrival of drug dog where officers "pursued their 
investigation diligently and with reasonable speed"). Watt has failed to show 
error in the district court's order affirming the magistrate's denial of his motion to 
suppress.2 
2 Watt cites both the Fourth Amendment and Art. I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution 
in his brief and notes the latter "provides more privacy protection as well as more 
remedial protection including suppression," specifically claiming that "[a]lthough 
the Federal Exclusionary rule has been whittled away at through case law, 
Idaho's Constitution and the Exclusionary Rule are still in full force and effect." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5, 7-8 (capitalization original).) Watt further argues 
"Idahoans are more protective of their privacy" and "are more concerned about 
the innocent being affected by overzealous police" and "thus the Courts should 
provide us with more protection." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Watt does not, 
however, explain why the legal standards relied upon by either the magistrate or 
the district court, and which are included in this brief, are inapplicable under Art. 
I, § 17; indeed, these same standards have been applied by Idaho's appellate 
courts in numerous cases as is evident by the citations to Idaho authority 
included in the record and this brief. Absent a cogent reason to now depart from 
those standards when considering a claim under Art. I, § 17, which Watt has not 
given, the Court should continue to adhere to them. See State v. Koivu, 152 
Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) ("We will ordinarily not overrule one of 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
decision affirming the magistrate's denial of Watt's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 2014. 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
L/ 
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